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Abstract 
 
A brief review of theoretical and empirical literature on the effort expended in 
making choices is followed by the description of an experiment in which 
participants were asked to respond to a series of road charging scenarios. 
Participants were asked to estimate the charges payable, to indicate their 
confidence in that estimate, to say how difficult they had found it to understand the 
scenario, and to indicate whether they would change their behaviour if the charges 
were introduced. The time they took to answer each question was recorded and 
background data was collected on their personal characteristics and attitudes as 
well as on their attitude to decision-making. Analysis of the resulting data shows 
that the time taken to estimate the charge and decide on a response varied not only 
with the characteristics of the scenario and with the order of presentation 
(indicating a learning, or fatigue, effect), but also with personal characteristics 
(notably age, educational attainment and self-reported decision-making style). The 
time taken to estimate a charge was significantly (and positively) related to the 
degree of difficulty reported and, although additional time devoted to making an 
estimate generally resulted in more accurate estimates, for the simplest scenarios, 
increased time taken was associated with reduced accuracy. 
These findings, particularly on the existence of groups with very different 
levels of motivation to make careful assessment of costs and benefits, and on the 
factors influencing the time taken to respond to questions, have implications for 
our understanding of real-world decision-making and for the way that we 
should collect and categorise choice data and model the decision-making process. 
The use of simple questions designed to elicit participants’ attitudes to decision-
making is seen to show great promise in this context. 
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1 Introduction 
  
1.1   Objective and Scope 
 
This paper reports results from a controlled experiment during which the time taken by 
participants to answer each question in an extended questionnaire was logged. It seeks 
to explore the factors influencing these latency values (and related variables such as 
accuracy achieved and difficulty reported) and, in so doing, to throw new light on 
issues which have arisen in previous work on decision latencies, task performance, 
attitude to decision-making, learning effects, and respondent fatigue. 
 
1.2 Background – Previous Exploration of Latencies 
 
Expenditure of effort is, of course, difficult to measure directly and many authors, 
have used decision latency (time taken to make a decision) as a proxy. There is a 
substantial literature on the time and/or effort expended by people when making 
choices. This literature includes both theoretical considerations and empirical results 
from a range of experiments. 
Theoretical considerations lead us to expect that the time taken to make choices 
generally increases with the complexity or difficulty of the task being performed. 
Numerous studies have confirmed this expectation (e.g. Wise and Cain (2000) find 
that the time taken to discriminate between stimuli varies inversely with the difference 
between them) and, since decision time latencies are now produced as a matter of 
course by widely used software, it is becoming commonplace to use decision latencies 
as a qualitative measure of task complexity. 
However, the relationship between task complexity and decision latency is not 
linear. There is well established theory (e.g. Newall and Simon 1972) and empirical 
evidence to suggest that, if a task is perceived as too difficult, some individuals will 
abandon any attempt to achieve a “full” resolution of the task and will instead adopt a 
simplified decision making procedure which might sometimes result in less time being 
taken to make the most complicated choices (e.g. Pollay 1970a,b; Onken et al. 1985).  
Bettman et al. (1990) examined the time taken by subjects to undertake a range of 
tasks and compared them with subjects’ own assessment of effort expended. They 
concluded that the time taken, and the estimate of effort, reflected the number and type 
of elementary information processes required to complete the task. They noted that 
different individuals required different amounts of time, and reported more effort, to 
complete different types of elementary information processes and that the individuals 
who found a given process (e.g. multiplication) particularly difficult were more likely 
to resort to heuristic solutions. 
The time taken to make a choice can be expected to vary between individuals 
depending on their personal decision-making styles. It will also reflect circumstances 
such as the extent of any distraction, the time pressure they are under and their current 
mental and motivational state. For example, Ratcliff and Rouder (1998) have shown 
that, in experimental conditions, latencies are reduced when instructions to subjects 
encourage a speedy response. Espinoza-Varas and Watson (1994) have shown that 
decision latencies vary with the decision criteria being employed. 
For any given individual, the time taken to make a choice will crucially depend 
on their familiarity with the task. Generally, the time taken by a given individual will 
reduce as they become more familiar with it. This effect is noted in the context of 
Bonsall and Lythgoe, Journal of Choice Modelling, 2(2), pp. 216-236   
 
218 
 
repeated choice experiments by authors such as Haaijer et al. (2000) and Rose and 
Black (2006) who note that decision latencies are much greater for the first few 
questions than for subsequent presentations of similar questions. This phenomenon is 
generally interpreted as a learning effect reflecting the fact that, with experience, 
people learn how to process the information more rapidly – for example by ignoring 
information which they perceive as irrelevant.  
Haaijer et al. (2000) use a filtering process to normalise the latencies for 
individual responses to remove differences between participants and order-related 
differences. They demonstrate that models which use these normalised latencies are 
better able to predict participants’ choices. Interestingly, they note that the latency 
parameter was negative in one experiment but positive in another (indicating that 
increased latency is associated with more systematic decisions in one experiment but 
with less systematic decisions in the other) – a fact whose significance we will revisit 
later in the paper.  
Rose and Black (2006) extended the work of Haaijer et al. (2000) and noted that 
models could also be improved by including the effect that decision latencies have on 
parameter variances. They concluded that the high variances associated with the first 
few decisions were an indication that respondents had not yet learned how to make the 
decisions and so could be used as a basis for excluding data from responses to the first 
few questions asked.  
 
2 The Experiment 
 
Our experiment was not designed simply to explore influences on decision latencies. 
Its broader aim was to explore the relationship between participants’ attitudes to a 
controversial policy intervention (road charging) and their engagement with the task of 
assessing the implications of complex examples of such policies and how they might 
respond to them
1
. This broader objective determined the structure and overall content 
of the questionnaire but left room to explore the factors affecting latencies for different 
types of question in different circumstances. The experimental protocol, including a 
list of questions asked, is provided in the Appendix 1 but, for convenience, is briefly 
summarised here.  
There were three groups of questions. In the first group, participants were 
presented with descriptions of road charging schemes in an entirely hypothetical 
network (five such schemes were presented in randomised order,  each with a different 
level of complexity – the most complex having charges which were different in each 
of three zones and two time periods). After each description participants were asked to 
estimate what the charge would be for a specified journey in that network, how certain 
they were about that estimate, and how easy it had been to understand the price 
structure.  
In the second group of questions, participants were given descriptions of charging 
schemes which might be introduced in their home city (five such schemes were 
                                           
1
 The work, described in Rößger et al. (2008), was conducted within a European Union funded 
project (DIFFERENT) which was exploring the optimal degree of complexity in infrastructure 
charges. It grew out of previous work by Bonsall et al. (2007a, b) which had shown that many 
people have a limited ability or motivation to respond complex price signals and a limited 
ability to assess the implications of complex pricing regimes, and work by Schade and Schlag 
(2003) which suggested that antipathy towards a policy instrument might reduce an 
individual’s willingness to engage with the assessment of that instrument.   
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presented in randomised order, each accompanied by an appropriate map and each 
having a different level of complexity). After each description they were asked to 
estimate what such a scheme might cost them per month (assuming no change in 
behaviour), how confident they were of that estimate, how effective they thought such 
a scheme might be, whether they expected to be better or worse off if such a scheme 
were introduced, what response they thought they would be most likely to make, 
whether they thought the charge fair or unfair, whether they would approve its 
introduction, and how complicated they thought it had been to understand.  
In the final group of questions, participants were asked to categorise their attitude 
to decision-making and to provide socio-economic data including gender, age, 
employment status, educational background and household income. Previous research 
into attitudes to decision-making has employed extensive batteries of questions to 
explore people’s need for cognition, their need to evaluate and their tolerance of 
ambiguity (see, respectively: Cacioppo and Petty 1982; Blair et al. 1996; and Budner 
1962 or Lamberton et.al. 2005). However, as is generally the case with field 
questionnaires, it would not have been practical to extend an already lengthy question 
by requiring participants to answer almost one hundred further questions. We sought 
instead to see whether the use of a single question drawn from each of the full 
batteries would provide a useful and practical approach by which to classify 
participants’ attitudes to decision-making2.  
The original experiment was conducted in January 2008 and the sample was 
extended with further data collection in Spring 2009. Three methods of recruitment 
were used; (i) emails to staff at Leeds University and to the UOLDS
3
 panel, (ii) 
posters at strategic locations around the university campus and (iii) direct contact with 
people at locations within the university.  
The questionnaire was programmed for CASI (Computer Assisted Self-
Interviewing) and could have been administered remotely on participants’ own 
computers. However, in order to minimize external influences on the latencies, all data 
was collected in a controlled laboratory environment in which all the computers were 
all of the same speed and were displaying the briefing material in an identical way. 
The controlled environment also made it possible to ensure that participants were not 
interrupted during the task and that each participant had the same amount of 
preparation time.  
Data was collected from 199 participants. Data from 6 participants was rejected 
as incomplete. The profile of participants is shown in Appendix 2. Although the 
sample was not designed to be representative of any specific population, it turns out to 
be fairly representative of drivers within the Leeds area – all be it with a bias towards 
students, people with degrees, females and people on higher incomes. 
 
 
 
                                           
2
 We recognize, of course, that we cannot claim that our single questions are fully 
representative of the batteries from which they were drawn and we therefore do not claim that 
our categorization of attitudes to decision-making is the same as that used in previous literature 
in that field. 
3
 The UOLDS (University of Leeds Driving Simulator) panel comprises drivers who have 
participated in driver behaviour studies in the recent past or who have registered their interest 
in doing so in forthcoming studies.  The panellists were recruited from a combination of the 
social, personal and research networks of university staff and students and therefore are 
predominantly, though not exclusively, from the university community.   
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3   The Results 
 
This section of our paper sets out the results in a logical order – moving from general 
observations, through tabulations and graphical displays, to modelling. The 
implications of these results are considered in the Discussion section. 
An initial investigation of the data revealed some outlying latencies. At the low 
end, latencies recorded for one participant were such as to suggest that that individual 
had completed the experiment with barely enough time to read the questions; data for 
this participant were excluded from further analyses. At the high end, overall latencies 
for some 15 participants were substantially higher than for the rest; closer 
investigation showed that these high overall latencies were caused by extra-ordinarily 
high latencies for one or two questions but that the questions associated with these 
outlying latencies varied from case to case. We cannot know whether the long 
latencies were due to difficulties experienced with specific questions or to extraneous 
causes (e.g. needing to sneeze) but the laboratory supervisor’s report indicated that 
some participants had asked for assistance during the experiment. Latencies in such 
cases will depend on how quickly the supervisor attended to them and are therefore 
unreliable. For some of the following analyses the original latency values have been 
truncated at the population mean plus three Standard Deviations for that question, in 
others they have been omitted. 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 are based on data truncated as described. Figure 1 shows the 
latency and participant-assessed degree of difficulty for estimating the charge of each 
of the five hypothetical charging regimes. As explained in Appendix 1, the schemes 
differed in terms of their inherent complexity and were labelled A-E (A being the 
simplest and E the most complex). 
As expected, the graph reveals a positive relationship between the complexity of 
a hypothetical charging regime and the time taken to estimate the cost of the specified 
journey (i.e. question H1) under that regime; participants required more than twice as 
long to calculate the charge for the most complex pricing scheme than for the simplest 
one. The graph also shows that the reported degree of difficulty in understanding the 
scheme (question H3) also rises with the objective degree of complexity. The 
relationship between the two items (latency and reported difficulty) was confirmed by 
a regression model which showed that 10% of the variation in reported difficulty was 
explained simply by the latency. 
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Figure 1: Mean time taken to estimate charge for, and reported difficulty 
understanding, different hypothetical schemes  
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Figure 2: Mean time taken to estimate charge for, and reported difficulty 
understanding, different Leeds schemes  
 
Figure 2 shows the equivalent relationships for the Leeds schemes; the striped bars 
again follow the solid bars indicating that reported difficulty is again related to 
latency. An interesting difference between Figures 1 and 2 is that, for the Leeds 
schemes (Figure 2), regime G has much higher latency, and is reported to be markedly 
more difficult to understand, than scheme H (Figure 1 showed no significant 
difference between schemes B and C). It seems that, for “real” schemes, spatial 
differentiation (having multiple zones) had much more effect on latencies than 
temporal differentiation (having multiple time periods).  
Figure 3 shows, for the five hypothetical schemes, how latency reduces with 
order of presentation. All five schemes show the expected downward trend (indicative 
of a learning effect) but it is interesting to note that whereas, for the most complex 
scheme (E), the learning effect continues undiminished up to the fifth presentation, for 
the simpler schemes (A, B and C) the effect is much diminished after the second 
presentation. 
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Figure 3: Relationship between latency and order of presentation (for the five 
hypothetical schemes) 
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 Figure 4: Relationship between latency and probability of error  
 
Figure 4 shows, for hypothetical schemes A and E, the relationship between the time 
taken to calculate the charge (H1) and the probability of making an inaccurate estimate 
(the x-axis is a series latency bins – the first being those participants whose latency for 
H1 was in the lowest quartile, while the y-axis shows the proportion of people in each 
latency quartile who provide an inaccurate estimate of the charge).  
For the simplest scheme (A), the probability of making an error increases with the 
time taken - suggesting perhaps that the task is so simple that extra time brings no 
increase in accuracy but is indicative of people finding the task difficult. For the most 
complex scheme (E), the probaility of making an error tends, if anything, to decease 
with time taken - suggesting perhaps that, for complex tasks, extra time is generally 
rewarded by greater accuracy (we note that, for scheme E, the third and fourth 
quartiles are likely to produce more error than the second quartile and suggest that this 
may indicate that a tail of people find the task so difficult that no amount of extra time 
will result in greater accuracy). 
An analysis was conducted to determine how long participants were taking to 
answer each question. Although the average time taken to answer each question was 
53.8 seconds, most took fewer than 10 seconds. Unsurprisingly, the time taken to 
answer the questions which required participants to estimate a charge (H1 and L1) 
took the longest to complete (56.9 and 39.5 seconds respectively) and the first such 
question (i.e. for the first-presented hypothetical scheme and for the first presented 
Leeds scheme) took the longest of all (92.9 and 70.8 seconds respectively).  
Tabulation of the time taken to complete the whole exercise, and to answer 
different types of question, showed that the values differed for different subgroups of 
participants. Although the times taken by different subgroups were not statistically 
different from those for the whole population, it appears that people over 35 years of 
age took noticeably longer to complete the experiment. More detailed investigation 
showed that females and people without a degree tended to take longer to estimate 
hypothetical charges (H1) and/or less time to assess their own decision style (E2, E3 
and E4). The strength of the learning effect (measured as the time taken to answer the 
first presented H1 question relative to that taken to answer the other four H1 
questions) was much lower for people who had no degree
4
 but was relatively strong 
for people who claimed (via E2) to gain satisfaction from completing tasks that have 
                                           
4 
This difference was the only one to achieve statistical significance.  
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required a lot of mental effort. Ratios were computed to indicate the amount of care 
taken by different types of participant when estimating the hypothetical charges. 
Compared to other participants, those claiming to gain satisfaction from mentally 
demanding tasks showed low ratios for error/latency and for uncertainty/latency 
(uncertainty being measured via H2). The highest error/latency ratio was for people 
with low incomes and the highest uncertainty/latency ratio was for people without a 
degree.  
Graphs and tabulations are useful but any serious attempt to determine significant 
influences on latencies and accuracies achieved requires the construction of models. 
Ideally, the models would permit detailed exploration of joint impacts, and allow for 
correlation between explanatory variables and the theoretical lower bound on 
latencies
5
. Resources did not permit such an approach in the current study and our 
exploration of the data has therefore been limited to the construction of regression 
models. The implication of this limitation will be discussed later.  
Table 1 contains nine of the models which were tested and shows values for the 
variables which offered significant explanation (at 5%) of the dependent variable. 
Except where indicated otherwise, the models were run on a dataset which excluded 
observations for which latencies were unusually high (> mean + 3 SD) and were run 
using SAS stepwise regression (with inclusion criterion set to 5%).  
Models 1 to 7 explore the extent to which the time taken by participants to 
respond to questions was significantly related to any aspect of the question, the 
scheme being considered or of their own characteristics.  
From model 1 we deduce that the time taken to complete the experiment is not 
well explained by any of our explanatory variables but that there is a tendency for 
people with a low need to evaluate (not feeling the need to consider all pros and cons 
before making a decision) to take less time and for people over 35 to take more time.  
From model 2 we deduce that the time taken to estimate the hypothetical charges 
is strongly affected by an order effect
6
. We also note that more time is taken to 
estimate the charge for schemes which are inherently complex (those whose 
description necessarily involved more numbers) or which were assessed by the 
participant as being complicated. Over and above this, we note that people who took a 
long time to answer the other questions were likely to take more time to estimate the 
charges. The fact that people with a degree took less time to estimate the hypothetical 
charges is interesting (and gratifying for those us involved in teaching!).  
From model 3 we deduce that the time taken to estimate the “real” charges (those 
in Leeds) is again influenced by an order effect
7
. We also again see a positive 
relationship with the perceived complexity and with the time that participants took to 
answer other questions. There are, however, some interesting differences between 
models 3 (which relates to “real” charges) and 2 (which relates to hypothetical 
charges): when dealing with “real” charges, the latency is related to the number of
                                           
5
 Strictly speaking, the fact that latencies cannot be less than zero should be allowed for in the 
specification of explanatory models.  
6
 Model 2 used the sequence (order), another model, not shown here for reasons of space, using 
the difference between the first and subsequent presentations (firstD), offered a similar 
degree of explanation and had very similar parameter values (the value of firstD was 41.98 
with a t-value of 19.26).  
7 
Another model using sequence (order) rather than firstD, offered a somewhat lower degree of 
explanation (adj. R
2
= 0.36) but had similar parameter values (the value of order was -7.79 
with a t-value of -15.02).  
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Table 1: Regression models 
 
 
Model 1† 2 3 4 5 6 7 8† 9 
Dependent variable Total 
time 
H1 
Time 
L1 
time 
L4 
time 
L7 
time 
L8 
time 
L9 
time 
E3 time Error in 
H1 
Constant 883.11 
(21.44) 
21.83 
(4.74) 
-36.86     
(-8.32) 
5.28 
(7.33) 
3.19 
(3.45) 
1.42 
(2.29) 
2.17 
(5.09) 
1.48 
(1.68) 
11.80 
(0.93) 
E
x
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s:
 
nzones 
 * 
11.33 
(7.13) 
* * * *  * 
nperiods 
 * 
4.82 
(3.12) 
* * * *  * 
nnos 
 
7.53 
(14.37) 
* * * * *  * 
complic 
 
0.179 
(5.50) 
0.08 
(3.30) 
* * * *  
0.45 
(2.61) 
order 
 
-12.02 
(19.99) 
 
-1.09   
(-8.56) 
-0.77   
(-5.07) 
-0.38     
(-3.66) 
-0.18   
(-2.58) 
 
* 
firstD 
 
 34.03 
(19.20) 
3.67 
(7.95) 
4.02 
(7.78) 
3.50  
(9.56) 
1.05 
(4.19) 
 
50.64 
(4.08) 
LschemeID 
 
 24.28 
(11.33) 
* * * *  
 
othertime 
 
0.0499 
(12.70) 
0.0423 
(13.19) 
0.0062 
(10.69) 
0.0050 
(7.24) 
0.0070 
(14.92) 
0.0034 
(10.55) 
0.0067 
(7.22) 
* 
forrevD 
 
* * * * * * * * * 
mentalSatD 
* * * 
0.56 
(2.16) 
0.64 
(2.07) 
* 
0.35 
(2.43) 
* 
-34.95    
(-3.54) 
lowNTED -141.68   
(-2.31) 
* * * * * * 
1.77 
(2.19) 
* 
clearcutD 
* * * * * * 
0.36 
(2.46) 
* * 
femD 
 
* * * * * * * * * 
oldD 99.32 
(3.09) 
* * * * * 
-0.30 
 (-2.03) 
* * 
employedD 
* * * * * 
-0.57 
 (-2.20) 
* * * 
degreeD 
* 
-5.35 
(-2.70) 
* * 
-1.00   
(-2.81) 
0.57 
(2.30) 
0.34 
(1.98) 
* * 
richD 
 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * 
ExtraLat 
 
 
      
-0.36     
(-2.04) 
Uncert  
 
      
6.63  
(2.75) 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.42 0..36 0.18 0.22 0.06 
Root MSE 221.07 25.89 20.94 4.00 3.30 3.17 2.17 2.88 149.25 
Number of obs. 193 950 942 947 477 946 951 193 965 
Notes for Table 1:  
* indicates explanatory variables considered stepwise, but which were not significant at 5% (blank 
cells indicate variables not considered). 
† models 1 and 8 were run using truncated values for unusually high latencies (versions of these 
models run excluding data with such latencies had failed to provide any significant explanation). 
For definition of variables see continuation of Table 1 on next page                                    /continued 
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Table 1: Regression models (cont’d) 
 
zones and time periods (with an additional effect associated with the most complicated  
scheme) rather than simply to the number of numbers required to describe the scheme; 
the effect of having a degree is no longer apparent; and the overall level of explanation 
is lower. 
From model 4 we deduce that the time taken by participants to decide whether 
they would be better or worse off due to a specified Leeds regime was again 
influenced by an order effect (over and above the effect of being first-presented), and 
that more time was taken by people who took longer to answer the other questions and 
by those claiming (via E2) to derive satisfaction from completing mentally demanding 
tasks. 
Model 5 suggests that the time taken by a participant to decide on their likely 
behavioural response to a specified Leeds regime was, again, influenced by an order 
effect (over and above the effect of being first-presented) and by the time they took to 
 
Definition of variables: 
Total time total time (secs) to complete experiment (after completion of tutorial)  
H1 time time (secs) to estimate journey cost under hypothetical regime 
L1 time time (secs) to estimate monthly cost under Leeds regime 
L4 time time (secs) to decide whether would be better or worse off due to Leeds regime 
L7 time time (secs) to decide on likely behavioural response to Leeds regime 
L8 time time (secs) to decide on fairness of Leeds regime 
L9 time time (secs) to decide whether they approve of Leeds regime 
E3 time time (secs) to respond to the question on their need to evaluate 
Error in H1 Difference (absolute) between the participant’s estimate of H1 and true value of H1 
nzones number of zones in described scheme 
nperiods number of time periods in described scheme  
nnos number of numbers employed to describe the scheme 
complic participant’s assessment of how complicated the scheme had been for them to 
understand (from H3 for hypothetical regime and from L10 for Leeds regime) (from 
0 = “easy” to 100 = “difficult”) 
order order in which the regime appeared to the participant  
firstD dummy (=1 if scheme was first to be shown to participant) 
LschemeID dummy (=1 if scheme was Leeds scheme I – see description in Appendix) 
othertime  total time (secs) to complete all other questions (excluding current one) 
forrevD dummy (=1 if participant thinks council’s main purpose of scheme was to raise 
revenue for non transport purposes (E1 = 3) 
mentalSatD dummy (=1 if participant claimed to gain satisfaction from completing a mentally 
demanding task (E2 = 1) ) 
lowNTED dummy (=1 if participant claimed not to need to evaluate all pros and cons before 
making decisions (E3 = 3 or 4) ) 
clearcutD dummy (=1 if participant claimed only to like dealing with problems which have a 
clear cut solution (E4 = 1 or 2) ) 
femD dummy (=1 if participant was female) 
oldD dummy (=1 if participant was over 35 years old) 
employedD dummy (=1 if participant was employed) 
degreeD dummy (=1 if participant had a degree) 
richD dummy (=1 if participant’s annual household income exceeds £30,000)  
ExtraLat H1Time – (H1 time as predicted using model 2)  
Uncert participant’s degree of uncertainty as to the accuracy of their cost estimate (H2) 
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answer the other questions, and that people claiming to gain satisfaction from mentally 
demanding tasks were again taking more time than others. Interestingly, after allowing 
for these effects, people with a degree took less time than others to answer this 
question (another model, not shown here, showed that the time taken to decide on the 
effectiveness of a specified Leeds regime was affected by the same variables and to 
similar extents, but that people with degrees actually took longer than other people – 
perhaps they were considering the issues more thouroughly?). 
From model 6 we deduce that the time taken to decide on the fairness of a 
specified Leeds regime is influenced by whether it was the first presented scheme 
(with a relatively weak order effect beyond that) and by the time taken by that 
participant to answer other questions. After allowing for these effects, less time was 
taken by people in employment and more by those with a degree.  
From model 7 we deduce that the time taken to decide whether they approve of a 
specified Leeds regime is affected by the order in which it was presented (with being 
presented first having a relatively small effect beyond that) and by the time taken by 
that person to answer other questions. We note that more time was taken by people 
claiming to derive satisfaction from completing a complex mental task or to feel 
comfortable only when dealing with problems which have a clear cut solution. We 
also note that, over and above the “other questions” effect, more time was taken by 
participants with a degree and less by those over 35.  
From model 8 we deduce that the time taken by participants to respond to the 
question on their need to evaluate is correlated with the time they took to answer other 
questions and, perhaps surprisingly, that it was longer for those claiming a no desire to 
consider all pros and cons before making a decision.  
Model 9 seeks to explain the error that participants make in estimating the charge 
for the hypothetical schemes (calculable this because we know what the correct charge 
was). The results are interesting although the model does not provide a good 
explanation of the data. It is clear that errors are greater for the first presented scheme 
(with no significant further reduction beyond that), for schemes perceived as 
complicated and when the participants express uncertainty as to the accuracy of their 
estimate. We also note that less error is made by participants who claim to derive 
satisfaction from completing a complex mental task and when participants took longer 
than normal (as represented by the variable Extralat) to provide the estimate
8
.  
Another model, not shown in Table 2, indicated that, as anticipated in Figure 1, 
the participant’s assessment of the degree of difficulty experienced in understanding a 
charging regime is positively associated with the time taken to estimate the charge.  
 
 
4   Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Using fairly simple analyses we have shown that the time taken to estimate the charge 
and decide on a response varied not only with the characteristics of the scenario (with 
more time taken to assess scenarios which were objectively more complicated) and 
with the order of presentation (indicating a learning, or fatigue, effect), but also with 
personal characteristics (notably age, educational attainment and attitude to decision-
                                           
8 Another model, from which Extralat was excluded, showed no significant relationship 
between error H1time – thus confirming that error is related to latency only when we consider 
latency over and above that which would be predicted for this participant and scheme. 
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making). We now discuss the significance and utility of these findings – but begin the 
discussion with a question….  
 
4.1 Are Latencies Indicative of Effort? 
 
Many previous researchers have assumed that latencies are an indication of effort 
expended. When dealing with differences in the time that one person takes to answer 
different questions this assumption is probably fairly safe (and our analysis suggests 
that when someone devotes extra time to making an estimate, the resulting estimate is 
more accurate). However, when comparing latencies of different people it would be 
dangerous to assume that this necessarily reflects different expenditures of effort – 
high latencies might simply be an indicator of a more relaxed, unhurried approach to 
the task.  
Our analyses have shown that different types of people took different lengths of 
time to complete the questionnaire and that they took different amounts of time on 
different questions. For example, although they took longer overall, people over 35 
took less time to indicate the extent to which they approved of each scheme (L9). 
Similarly, although people with a degree took less time to estimate charges (H1) and 
to indicate what their considered behavioural response might be (L7), they took longer 
to consider whether a given scheme was likely to be effective (L3) or fair (L8) and to 
indicate whether they approved of it (L9). 
Answers to our questions on attitudes to decision-making (E2, E3 and E4) helped 
to explain why different people took different lengths of time to answer different types 
of question. It appears that participants who reported (via E2) gaining satisfaction 
from completing mentally demanding tasks took longer to assess scheme 
effectiveness, to decide whether it would leave them better or worse off, to report their 
considered behavioural response, and to indicate the extent of their approval of the 
scheme. Those who claimed (via E3) not to feel a need to evaluate all pros and cons 
before making decisions took less time to complete the experiment, and those who 
reported (via E4) only liking to deal with problems which have a clear cut solution 
took longer to decide whether they would approve or disapprove of the scheme. The 
ratios of error to latency and of uncertainty to latency may be taken as indicators of 
“lack of care” and we note that these ratios were particularly low for people who gain 
satisfaction from mentally demanding tasks. It was also apparent that these people, 
and those who like to evaluate all the pros and cons, displayed stronger learning 
effects than other participants. Questions E2, E3 and E4 seem to be revealing not only 
different attitudes to decision making but also different propensities to engage with 
mental tasks.  
Comparison of efforts expended by different people is clearly a complex issue 
whose resolution requires neural or physiological data but, meanwhile it seems that an 
indication of effort can be found by calculating the additional latency (beyond that 
which is expected for a given participant and task), and that questions on attitudes to 
decision-making can provide pointers to their likely degree of engagement with a task. 
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4.2 Factors Affecting Latencies 
 
There is a clear and unsurprising link between latencies and the difficulty which 
participants report as having had in understanding the schemes. As expected, and in 
line with previous research, we find that latencies for the estimation of charges are 
related to task complexity. However, our new evidence allows us to extend this 
general finding to suggest that, in hypothetical contexts, complexity can be measured 
by the number of numbers used to describe the problem and that, in our experiment, 
after allowing for “the number of numbers”, no additional effect was found for the 
number of zones or the number of time periods. However, where the context is “real”, 
we find that the number of numbers has less impact than the more tangible indicators 
(the number of zones and the number of time periods). We also note that, in our “real” 
context, spatial complexity (number of zones) appears to have more influence than 
temporal complexity (number of time periods). 
As expected, different types of question were associated with different latencies. 
In our experiment, questions requiring the participant to estimate charges were much 
more time consuming than those which asked them to assess the fairness or 
effectiveness of the scheme or indicate their likely behavioural response to it. We note 
that the inherent complexity of the scheme (objective or perceived) had no significant 
effect on the time participants took to decide on its effectiveness, whether it would 
leave them better or worse off, how to respond, whether it was fair, or whether they 
approved of it. Taken together with the fact that there was little evidence of any 
learning effect (reduction of latencies after the first presentation) for these questions, 
this might lead to the rather alarming conclusion that participants did not feel the need 
to consider the scheme details when answering such questions. The fact that 
participants took relatively little time to indicate their likely behavioural response to 
the charging regimes might itself be of concern to analysts who deal with stated choice 
data but it should be noted that, since the response questions (L6 and L7) were asked 
after participants had estimated the charges considered whether they would be better 
or worse off if they continued driving, they were perhaps only the final stage of a 
considered decision on an appropriate behavioural response. 
 
4.3 The Relationship between Latency and Accuracy 
 
Although, taken as a whole, the results do not show any clear relationship between 
time taken to estimate a charge and the accuracy of the resulting estimate, Closer 
examination reveals some very interesting relationships. 
Figure 4 showed that the relationship between latency and likelihood of error 
differs according to the complexity of the task. For very simple tasks extra time does 
not seem to result in reduced errors, rather it seems to reflect the degree of difficulty 
being experienced by the participant. However, for tasks requiring some effort, extra 
time generally results in fewer errors. This interpretation might explain the finding by 
Haaijer et el. (2000) that their normalised latencies were associated with more 
systematic decisions in one experiment but with less systematic decisions another; we 
note that they found an association with more systematic decisions in an experiment 
dealing with a relatively complex choice context whereas they found an association 
with less systematic decisions came from an experiment where, if the respondent 
recognised the attributes, the task was very simple. This again suggests that, in 
potentially simple choice contexts, extra time may indicate that the decision-maker 
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was experiencing a problem whereas, when the choice context is complex, extra time 
is an indication that more effort has been expended. 
Model 9 showed that accuracies were significantly increased when a participant 
spent more time than would be expected (given the nature of the task and their 
personal characteristics). Other analyses showed that the time taken to estimate a 
charge was significantly (and positively) related to participant’s assessments of the 
degree of difficulty they had experienced in understanding that scenario, and that 
accuracy is much increased for second and subsequent presentations.  
 
4.4 Use of Latencies to Identify “Good” Data – the Interplay of 
Learning and Fatigue Effects 
 
Initial examination of latencies revealed some outliers; those at the low end were such 
as to suggest that participants could not have given serious attention to the task in 
hand. Several of those at the high end were subsequently found to be associated with 
interruptions to the experimental process. These findings would support the use of a 
lower bound, and perhaps also an upper bound, on latencies as the basis for exclusion 
of some observations from a dataset.  
In line with previous research, and consistent with the existence of a learning 
effect, we found a strong order effect in the response latencies. However, our results 
show that the strength and duration of the order effect is very different for different 
questions – being very strong for the calculation questions (H1 and L1) but 
imperceptible for those which sought an assessment of the scheme or an indication of 
behavioural response. Moreover, the strength and duration of the order effect also 
varied with the complexity of the scheme (being stronger, and lasting longer, for the 
most complex scheme); reductions in latency following the first presentation were 
apparent for all schemes but further reductions were apparent up until the fifth 
presentation only for the most complex scheme.  
Rose and Black (2006) proposed examining decision latencies to determine the 
point in a repeated sequence of questions when participants have learned how to 
process the information. They suggested that, having thus identified data from the 
period during which learning was still occurring, better fitting models could be built if 
such data were ignored. We certainly see the value of such an approach. However, 
given that we found the strength of the learning effect to vary by type of question and 
to be different for different types of people
9
, we suggest that further improvements to 
models might be obtained by being more discriminating in the selection of which data 
to exclude (e.g. using the trend in normalised latencies to identify the appropriate cut 
off for each question and participant, rather than devising a general rule such as 
“exclude the first five observations”).  
A note of caution is appropriate here; although it is possible that high decision 
latencies are a signal that the participant has not yet learned how to process the 
experimental data, the reduction in the time taken to make choices during a choice 
experiment might also be evidence of an experimentally-induced fatigue effect 
whereby participants simply ignore information which they find difficult to deal with 
– in which case one might wish to exclude the data from questions with low latencies 
                                           
9 
The learning effect was weakest for people who have no degree and strongest for people who 
report gaining satisfaction from mentally demanding tasks or a desire to consider all pros and 
cons before making a decision (via E2 and E3 respectively). 
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rather than from those with high latencies. One might perhaps be particularly 
suspicious of low latencies in data from experiments in which participants were 
motivated by a reward simply for completing a task (see Bonsall 2002).  
The difference between a legitimate learning effect and an artificial experimental 
effect is, of course, difficult to determine. The development of an effort-minimisation 
strategy whereby people concentrate their attention on information which is easiest to 
process may reflect the widespread use of heuristics for real world decisions. 
However, low latencies become suspect if they are likely to have been stimulated by 
the experimental context. It is clearly a worrying possibility that long sequences of 
similar questions in a stated choice experiment might encourage development of an 
effort minimisation strategy.  
One might perhaps distinguish between a legitimate learning effect and an 
artificial (experimentally-induced) effort-reduction effect by noting whether the 
latencies reduce after the first question (in which case one might deduce that it is a 
learning effect) or after several (in which case one might begin to suspect an effort-
minimisation strategy). Reassuringly, we, like Rose and Black, find that response time 
latencies reduce most significantly between the first and second choices and even 
though they continue to fall throughout the sequence, we find no evidence of any 
acceleration in the rate of decline after several repetitions. 
 
4.5 The Significance of an Individual’s Attitude to Decision-making 
 
The results from our simple questions on attitudes to decision-making are very 
exciting. One of our most important findings is perhaps that the accuracy of estimates 
was not related to latency, or even very strongly to expressed confidence in the 
estimate, but that it reflected the level of satisfaction which the participant claimed to 
derive from completing mentally demanding tasks.  
As has been noted above, participants claiming to gain such satisfaction exhibited 
a stronger learning effect, made more accurate estimates of the charges, and took more 
care in making their estimates. They also took longer to assess scheme effectiveness, 
to decide whether it would leave them better or worse off, to report their considered 
behavioural response, and to indicate the extent of their approval of the scheme. Those 
who reported feeling no need to evaluate all pros and cons took less time to complete 
the experiment. Those who reported wanting to work on problems only if they had a 
clear cut solution took longer to decide whether they would approve or disapprove of 
the scheme.  
It seems that our question E2, in particular, provides a simple, and thus very 
practical, indicator of a participant’s attitude to mental tasks and that this is strongly 
related to the likelihood of them being able or willing to make accurate estimates. We 
are not aware of any previous example of this relationship having been revealed and 
suggest that it may have important implications for the understanding of decision 
making and for the segmentation of models.  
 
4.6 Recommendations for Further Work 
 
Our results confirm the value of latency data as a source of insight into the duration of 
learning processes and effort expended and as a basis for exploration of differences 
between the decision making processes of different types of participant. We suggest 
that there is considerable scope for more work in this area.  
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At a practical level we strongly recommend collection of latencies (appropriately 
normalised to allow for person-specific effects) to help identify data which ought to be 
excluded or subject to more detailed investigation. High latencies may indicate an 
incomplete learning effect while low latencies may indicate fatigue or experimentally-
induced lack of engagement – or the use of heuristic decision rules.  
The relationships revealed in Figure 4, and in Haaijer et al. (2000), suggest that 
high latencies might be indicative of problems in simple choice contexts but of effort 
in more complex choices. If so, this further reinforces the need to be circumspect in 
the use of high (or low) latency values to exclude data from choice experiments – one 
might quite unintentionally exclude the most important data! Thought should perhaps 
be given to supplementing data on latencies with data on participants’ assessment of 
the difficulty they had experienced in making the choice (we suggest this may be more 
reliable than asking them to indicate how much confidence they have in their choice). 
It might be very interesting to explore the extent to which these variables are 
providing different types of insight or may be considered as alternatives. 
Our experiment was conducted in controlled (“laboratory”) conditions in order to 
reduce the risk that variance in latencies might be caused by external distractions. 
Latencies collected in uncontrolled conditions are likely to contain more “noise” and 
hence to be less useful. Work is underway to compare the variance in latencies 
collected in laboratory conditions with those collected from an online version of the 
same experiment.  
We see particular scope for using decision latencies in repeated choice 
experiments to study the duration of learning processes, the onset of fatigue effects 
and the relationship between the two. Segmentation of sequential choices into initial 
choices with high latencies, subsequent choices with lower, but stable, latencies, and 
later choices with decreased latencies might be a particularly fruitful first step. 
Separate analysis of data from these three groups might be very rewarding.  
Previous work on attitudes to decision-making has used batteries of questions 
which are quite time consuming for the participant. Incorporation of these batteries 
into an already long questionnaire results in an excessively long questionnaire and so 
risks low response rates and consequential bias. Although we would not claim that our 
questions E2, E3 and E4 have the strength of the full batteries from which they were 
drawn, they can easily be included at the end of a questionnaire which has been 
mainly concerned with other issues and they do appear to be capturing important 
attributes of participants which help to explain not only their decision latencies but 
also the accuracy of their estimates. This finding has great potential significance for 
data collection practice. It would, for example, be very interesting to see whether, 
having included such questions in a stated preference questionnaire, the resulting 
variables could further improve the robustness of the choice models or provide the 
basis for appropriate segmentation of participants. We are pursuing this avenue of 
research and would recommend others to do likewise. 
Our work in this field is ongoing. We will shortly report on a comparison of 
results from our Leeds experiment with a matched experiment conducted in Dresden, 
on latencies collected via the web, and on a more detailed analysis of the relationship 
between decision latencies, accuracies, approval and other factors affecting 
engagement with the topic. Our further analysis will explore the extent to which the 
use of more sophisticated modelling methods (allowing for the lower bound on 
latencies and explicitly recognising the dependencies and joint influences of different 
factors) can provide any further insight. To this end we intend to explore the use of 
MANOVA, SURE and Tobit approaches.  
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Appendix 1: Description of the Experimental Protocol  
 
Participants were recruited for “a study of travel costs in Leeds” and were offered a 
payment of £5. Those who confirmed that they drove on a regular basis in the city of 
Leeds were allocated an appointment to attend the laboratory. On arrival at the 
laboratory they were welcomed, their name was checked against the attendance list 
and they were taken to a computer in a small booth and instructed on how to log on. 
Once logged on, the software gave them a brief tutorial explaining how to interact 
with the software (typing in an answer or moving a cursor to a position along a scale) 
and gave them a test question. The system clock began when they had completed this 
test question. 
The main survey was split into three sections. The first section sought the 
participants’ response to each of five charging scenarios for a hypothetical journey 
(the journey was always the same; a 20 mile journey from A to B starting at 0740 and 
travelling at a constant 30 miles per hour - and they were helpfully informed that it 
would therefore take 40 minutes and that they would arrive at B at 0820). Each 
scenario included one or more distance-based charges operating in specified parts of 
the city during specified hours and was described such that the participant had 
sufficient information to calculate the price that they would have to pay to make that 
journey under the specified pricing regime. The five schemes (A-E), which were 
presented in randomized order, differed in terms of their inherent complexity (A had 
one zone and one time period, B had one zone and one time period, B had two zones 
and one time period, C had one zone and two time periods, D had two zones and two 
time periods, E had three zones and two time periods). Figure A1 shows how they 
were presented. 
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Figure A.1: Screen dumps for Schemes A (left) and E (right) 
 
For each of the five schemes, three questions were asked while the appropriate map 
and description was displayed on screen: 
H1 How much do you think the congestion charge for the specified journey 
would be (in pounds and pence)? ... 
H2 How certain are you of that estimate? Potential responses were: 1 “very 
certain”, 2 “to within 5% (i.e. plus or minus x)”, 3 “to within 10% (i.e. plus 
or minus x)”, 4 “to within 25% (i.e. plus or minus x)”, 5 “to within 50% (i.e. 
plus or minus x)”, 6 “to within 100% (i.e. plus or minus x)”, 7 “even less sure 
than that”. In each case, x was calculated from their estimate at H1) 
 H3 How complicated do you think this congestion charging scheme is to 
understand? (on a scale from 0=”easy” to 100= “difficult”). 
 
The second section of the questionnaire was concerned with five charging schemes for 
the city of Leeds. The schemes, which were presented in randomized order, differed in 
terms of their inherent complexity. Scheme details were summarized on an annotated 
map (Figure A2 shows the presentation of scheme I) and in text. The texts for schemes 
F-J were:  
F  “A £5 charge to use any roads in inner or outer zone between 0700 and 0900” 
G  “A £4 charge to use any roads in outer zone plus £6 charge to use any roads 
in inner zone (between 0700 and 0900 in each case)” 
H “Charges to use any roads in inner or outer zone; £4 between 0700 and 0800, 
or £6 between 0800 and 0900” 
I  “Charges to use any roads in outer zone; £3 between 0700 and 0800, or £5 
between 0800 and 0900. Charges to use any roads in inner zone; £5 between 
0700 and 0800, or £6 between 0800 and 0900” 
J “Charge to use Arterial roads in inner or outer zone: £4. Charge to use major 
arterial roads in inner or outer zone: £6” 
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Figure A.2: Screen dump for Leeds Scheme I 
 
For each of the five Schemes ten questions were asked while the map and description 
were displayed on screen: 
L1 How much do you think this congestion charge would cost you per month? 
(assume that you carry on making all the journeys that you make in a typical 
month)….…pounds and pence 
L2  How certain are you of that estimate? (options as per H2) 
L3  How effective do you think this charge would be in reducing congestion? (on a 
scale from 0 Ineffective to 100 Effective) 
L4  On balance, if you carried on driving and had to pay the charges, do you think 
that you personally would be better off (because of driving conditions) or 
worse off (because of having to pay the charge)? (on a scale from 0 Better off 
to 100 Worse off) 
L5  How sure are you that you would be this much better off or worse off? (on a 
scale from 0 Just a guess, to 100 Completely sure) 
L6  If this congestion charge were to be introduced, would you need time to 
decide what to do? (the options being: 1 No, I would simply carry on driving as 
now, 2 No, I definitely reduce the amount of driving I do in the charge zone, and 
3 Yes, I would want to think carefully about the costs and benefits of all the 
alternatives- then decide what to do) 
L7  Do you think that, when you have had time to think more carefully, you would 
be more likely to ...(the options being: 1 Carry on driving as now, 2 Reduce the 
amount of driving I do in the charge zone, and 3 Really don’t know what you 
would do) 
L8  Different People would be affected by the scheme in different ways. Overall, 
do you think that a charge is fair or unfair? (on a scale from 0 Fair to 100 
Unfair)  
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L9  Would you approve or disapprove of this congestion charging scheme? (on a 
scale from 0 Disapprove to 100 Approve) 
L10 How complicated do you think this congestion charging scheme was to 
understand? (on a scale from 0 Easy to 100 Difficult) 
 
The third section included nine questions designed to obtain background information 
on the participant and their attitudes: 
E1  What do you think would be the Council's main reason for introducing road 
charges like the ones we have described? (the options being: 1 To raise 
revenue for investing in public transport, 2 To raise revenue for investing in 
roads, 3 To raise revenue for non-transport purposes, 4 To reduce the amount 
of traffic on the roads, and 5 Don’t know) 
E2 In general, when you complete a task that has required a lot of mental effort, 
do you feel satisfied - or relieved that it is over? (the options being: 1 Mainly 
satisfied, 2 Mainly relieved, and 3 Half and half)  
E3  In general, would you say that you are the sort of person who likes to work 
out all the pros and cons before making a decision? (the options being: 1Yes 
certainly, 2 Yes, 3 No, and 4 Certainly not) 
E4   In general, would you say that you are the sort of person who likes to work on 
a problem only if there is a possibility of coming up with a clear-cut and 
unambiguous answer? (the options being: 1 Yes certainly, 2 Yes, 3 No, and 4 
Certainly not) 
(Questions E5-E9 respectively sought gender, age, employment status, educational 
background and household income).   
 
 
Appendix 2: Profile of Participants 
 
Attribute Category   N* % 
Gender Male 91 47.2 
Female 102 52.8 
Age  17-25 31 16.1 
26-35 79 40.9 
36-45 50 25.9 
46-55 25 13.0 
56-69 8 4.1 
Employment status Employed 148 76.7 
Self-employed 6 3.1 
Retired/ Unemployed/ Home maker  4 2.1 
Student  35 18.1 
Educational 
background 
School level qualifications 28 14.5 
Degree  95 49.2 
Professional qualifications  18 9.3 
Degree and professional qualifications 52 26.9 
Annual Household 
Income 
Up to £13,499 19 9.8 
£13,500 - £29,999 65 33.7 
£30,000 - £49,999 64 33.2 
£50,499 - £74,999 35 18.1 
£75,000 or more 10 5.2 
 
